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  It is well known that Bob Flood’s second paper with Peter Garber (Flood and Garber, 
1980b) was an influential pioneering work in empirical testing for the existence of bubble 
phenomena in rational expectations macroeconomics.  It is not so well known, by contrast, that his 
paper with Burmeister and Garber (Burmeister, Flood, and Garber, 1983) provided one of the 
earliest steps toward a useful and general classification of rational expectations solutions, theirs 
focussing on the distinction between bubble and bubble-free (or fundamentals) solutions.
1  The 
present paper amounts to an extension of this type of classificational analysis, together with an 
attempt to establish the scientific merits of one particular scheme. 
For many years now it has been commonplace knowledge that many dynamic models with 
rational expectations (RE) feature a multiplicity of paths that satisfy all of the conditions for 
intertemporal equilibrium.   Indeed, most dynamic RE models that are not based on explicit 
optimization analysis of individuals’ behavior fall into that category and so do some that involve 
full-fledged general equilibrium analysis with optimizing agents.
2     But in many applications the 
analyst is not specifically concerned with this multiplicity—often interpreted as the possible 
existence of "bubbles"—and wishes to focus attention on one particular path that is presumed to be 
                                                            
1    What, it might be asked, is the definition of a bubble in a rational expectations model?  The 
basic idea of Burmeister, Flood, and Garber (1983) is that a bubble is an extra component that 
arises in addition to the component that reflects “market fundamentals,” an important implication of 
which is that bubble components are not necessarily explosive.  Unfortunately, the identification of 
market fundamentals has to be made on a model-specific basis, although there is rarely any 
disagreement.  Below it will be argued that the MSV solution procedure is constructed so as to 
yield the market fundamentals solution, thereby providing  a method for defining bubbles in 
particular cases. 
 
2   Leading examples of the latter type include real asset price bubbles in overlapping-generations 
models, as demonstrated by Calvo (1978) and Woodford (1984), and price level bubbles in infinite-
horizon monetary models, as in Brock (1975), Flood and Garber (1980b), Gray (1986), and 
Obstfeld  and Rogoff (1983). 
 
  1 of economic relevance, e.g., if bubbles were absent.
3   Consequently, several alternative criteria 
have been proposed for selection of the path on which to focus.  Among these are Taylor’s  (1977) 
"minimum-variance” criterion, the  "expectational-stability” criterion of Evans (1985) (1986), the 
"minimal-state variable" criterion made explicit in McCallum (1983), and the popular "saddle path" 
or "stability” criterion. The latter is favored by Sargent (1987), Whiteman (1983), Blanchard and 
Kahn (1980), Blanchard and Fischer (1989), and many others, and is often used in computation 
algorithms such as King and Watson (1995) or Klein (1997). 
     In practice, analysts are often unclear as to which of the criteria is being utilized, when attention 
is focused on a single solution, because in many cases the last three of the four above-listed criteria 
all point to the same solution.  Some analysts are explicit, however, and a sampling of the literature 
suggests that the most frequently adopted of the criteria, in these cases of explicit justification, is 
that of stability or non-explosiveness.  The stability criterion has been recommended, moreover, in 
the influential textbooks of Sargent  (1987, pp.  197-9, 306-7) and Blanchard and Fischer (1989, pp. 
225, 260). 
     One purpose of the present paper is to consider the strengths and weaknesses for scientific 
research of these alternative criteria.   In particular, it will be argued that the stability and 
minimum-variance criteria are inherently unsatisfactory.   By contrast, the minimal-state-variable 
(MSV) criterion is scientifically attractive, according to our argument, for it provides a 
classificational scheme that is designed to be useful in terms of positive analysis.   The criterion of 
expectational stability, finally, will be characterized as reflecting a substantive behavioral 
hypothesis rather than a classification scheme, so its attractiveness is an empirical issue rather than 
a  question  of constructive scientific practice. 
                                                            
3   Although empirical testing is attractive in principle, this practice is in fact extremely common.  
This seems to be recognized by Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p. 260). 
  2   A second purpose of the paper is to emphasize that the minimal-state-variable (MSV) 
criterion generally identifies a single solution that can reasonably be interpreted as the unique 
solution that is free of bubble components, i.e., the fundamentals solution.  It can accordingly be 
used as the basis for tests of a substantive hypothesis to the effect that bubble solutions are not of 
empirical relevance.  This hypothesis would remain of interest, moreover, even if the association of 
the MSV criterion with the bubble-free property were not accepted. 
     In conducting this argument, it will be expositionally useful to provide illustrations in the 
context of a particular example.  Consequently, one will be developed in Section II.   The 
unsatisfactory nature of the minimum variance and stability criteria will then be argued in Section 
III.   Section IV will make the case for the MSV criterion, with attention being devoted to a critical 
argument of Froot and  Obstfeld  (1991),  and Section V will consider the “expectational stability” 
criterion of Evans (1985, 1988).  Next, Section VI will demonstrate how unique MSV solutions can 
be defined and calculated in a very wide class of linear rational expectations models, after which 
Section VII will describe the relevance of the foregoing analysis for some prominent recent 
research.  Finally, Section VIII will provide a brief summary. 
II.  An Illustrative Model 
     As a vehicle for illustrating several of the points to be made below, consider the familiar Cagan 
money demand function 
(1)        mt - pt = γ + αEt∆pt+1 +ξt,                                              α<0 
where mt and pt are logs of an economy's nominal money stock and  its  price level.  Also, Et(⋅) is 
defined as E(⋅|Ωt), where Ωt includes mt,mt-1,..., pt, pt-1,..., and ξt,  ξt-1,....   The disturbance ξt, which 
reflects random behavioral demand shifts, will be assumed to be a random walk variate so that ∆ξt 
= ut is white noise.  For our purposes it is of no consequence whether or not one conceives of (1) as 
  3 resulting from an explicit maximization problem, since there are such models that give rise to 
multiple solutions and our points are designed to be relevant for any model with multiple 
solutions—with correct  account   being   taken   of   all   non-negativity requirements,  
transversality  conditions,  and  anything  else  that   might eliminate some paths from contention as 
solutions. 
     To represent policy behavior that generates the money supply, we will adopt a rule of the 
following form: 
(2)    ∆mt = µ0 + µ1∆pt-1. 
Thus the money stock growth rate in each period is related to inflation in the previous period.  One 
would expect sensible policy behavior to involve a negative value of µ1, so that money creation is 
slowed when recent inflation has been rapid, and a value that is not too large (so as to avoid 
instrument instability).  But for the present we shall adopt only the restriction µ1 ≤ (α-1)
2 /(-4α), 
which is necessary (as we shall see) for the ∆pt solution values to involve real (i.e., non-complex) 
numbers.  It would of course be possible to include a random disturbance term in (2) as well as  (1), 
but nothing would be gained and clutter would be added.  To complete the model, it needs to be 
specified that it pertains to all periods t = 1,2,... with  m0 and ∆p0 given.  The specified type of 
policy behavior can therefore only be adopted after an economy is already in existence so that ∆p0 
and m0 will be well defined.   Inserting (2) into the first difference of (1) yields 
(3)    µ0 + µ1∆pt-1 = ∆pt + αEt∆pt+1 - αEt-1∆pt + ut, 
and for present purposes it will suffice to consider solutions of the form
4 
(4)    ∆pt = π0 + π1∆pt-1 + π2ut.     
                                                            
4   This point will be explained below, in Section IV. 
  4 The latter implies Et∆pt+1 = π0 + π1(π0 + π1∆pt-1 + π2ut) so substitution into (3) yields 
(5)    µ0 + µ1∆pt-1 = π0 + π1∆pt-1 + π2ut + απ0 + απ1(π0 + π1∆pt-1 + π2ut) - α(π0 + π1∆pt-1) + ut. 
Thus for (4) to be a solution it must be true that 
(6a)   µ0 = π0 + απ1π0 
(6b)   µ1 = π1 + απ1
2  - απ1 
(6c)   0 = π2 + απ1π2 +1. 
The second of these clearly implies that
5 
(7)    π1 = 
α
αµ + − α ± − α
2





Once it is decided whether to add or subtract the positive term d ≡ [(α-1)
2  + 4αµ1]
1/2, the values of 
π0 and  π2  will  be  defined  uniquely.   But that decision is crucial for determining the model’s 
implied behavior of ∆pt.  That fact is illustrated in Figure 1, where π1
+ = (α - 1 + d)/2α and π1
− =  
(α - 1 - d)/2α are plotted for α = - 4 (representative for all α < -1) against µ1. Clearly, values of π1
+ 
(the lower branch) and π1
−  (the upper branch) lie both within and outside of the range  -1 < π1 < 1 
that is necessary for dynamic stability.  (In the somewhat unrealistic case with –1 <α < 0, not 
illustrated in Figure 1, π1
− exceeds 1.0 for all µ1 that give real roots.) 
     A particularly simple and transparent special case of this example occurs when µ1 = 0 in (2), so 
that the money stock growth rate is constant.  In that case one might expect ∆pt-1 to be absent from 
(4), since it does not appear in the model and can affect the value of ∆pt only if it is (arbitrarily) 
expected by the economy's participants to affect ∆pt.  Thus we are led to look for solutions of the 
form ∆pt = π0 + π2ut in this case, and we find that ∆pt = µ0 – ut.  This result is of course consistent 
                                                            
5   From (7) we see that µ1 > (α-1)/(-4α) would give complex roots. 
  5  
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  6  with our more general example.  Indeed, the solutions in (7) for π1 are π1
+  =  0 and π1
-  = (α-1)/α  
when µ1 = 0, the first of which implies the  absence  of  ∆pt-1 from (4) and duplicates the solution 
just found.
6   The second value, π1
− = (α-1)/α, is with α < 0 unambiguously greater than 1.0, so it 
implies an explosive, dynamically unstable path.   Furthermore, this value π1
− will support an 
infinity of unstable paths.  This may be seen by supposing that π3ut-1 is added to the conjectured 
solution in (4) and then verifying that this expression is consistent with all of the model's equations 
for any value of π3  (upon which π2 depends).
7    If π1
+  = 0 is taken as the relevant value for π1, 
however, it is implied that π3 = 0 and π2 = −1. 
  Note that in the special case in which µ1 = 0, the solution involving π1
+ (i.e., ∆pt = µ0 – ut) is 
clearly the one that would be regarded as the bubble-free or fundamentals solution by Burmeister, 
Flood, and Garber (1983).
8  Indeed, analogous solutions are so regarded quite generally in the 
literature in examples similar to our special case.  By contrast, the solutions involving π1
− would 
generally be regarded, in this special case, as bubble solutions—i.e., solutions that add bubble 
components to the fundamentals solution.  McCallum (1983, pp. 147, 161) proposed a general 
extension of the bubble vs. bubble-free terminology to cases analogous to those in which µ1 ≠ 0 in 
the example at hand; that extension will be utilized below. 
                                                            
6   Note that π1
+ = 0 because (α-1) + [(α-1)
2]
1/2 = (α-1) – (α-1) since [(α-1)
2]
1/2 is by convention a 
positive number and α-1 is in the present case negative. 
 
7   The undetermined-coefficient conditions are (6a), (6b), 0 = π2 + απ1π2 + απ3 + 1, and 0 = π3 + 
απ1π3 - απ3.  With π1 = (α-1)/α, the last of these is satisfied for any π3 and the next to last relates 
π2 to π3. 
 
8   Burmeister, Flood, and Garber (1983) work in the context of a Cagan-style model similar to (1), 
except with a white-noise rather than a random-walk disturbance, and define the bubble-free or 
fundamentals solution as the one that depends only upon “current and expected future values of 
money and the disturbance” (1983, p. 312). 
  7 III.  The Stability and Minimum Variance Criteria 
     As it happens, extensive utilization of the foregoing example will be briefly delayed, for our 
argument concerning the stability and minimum-variance criteria can be developed without 
reference to any particular model.   Let us begin with Taylor’s  (1977) minimum-variance criterion.  
According to the latter, the choice among multiple solutions should be dictated by the 
unconditional variance of a variable analogous  to ∆pt in the foregoing example.  But there are two 
serious flaws with this proposal, the first of which is its ambiguity.  Specifically, in many models 
there will be more than one endogenous variable of interest.  (In fact, even in the example of 
Section II—despite the appearance of equation  (3)—there are two endogenous variables, ∆pt and 
∆mt.)  But in such cases the minimum variance criterion will not be well specified, because the 
various endogenous variables may indicate different solutions.  Indeed, in some cases there may 
even exist some ambiguity as to whether the (possibly detrended) level or first difference of a given 
variable is relevant.   Second, the minimum-variance criterion is presumably intended to pertain to 
the solution path that would be empirically relevant.  But that would of course suggest that the 
modeled economy's agents are motivated to choose the minimum-variance solution over others, and 
it is not the case that agents will typically be so motivated.  Indeed, the minimum-variance criterion 
evidently pertains to some social desideratum, not anything that could be affected by any single 
agent's choice.  Consequently, the model's agents will have no incentive to select this solution path, 
so there is no particular reason to believe that it would in fact be empirically relevant. 
     Turning now to the case of the stability criterion, our argument is quite different.  Here the 
problem is that the criterion is, to a significant extent, self-defeating.  For the criterion is precisely 
that the selected solution path must be non-explosive—dynamically stable—under the natural 
presumption that exogenous driving variables  (such  as  shocks  and  policy instruments) are non-
  8 explosive.   Yet one important objective of dynamic economic analysis is to determine whether 
particular hypothetical policy rules—or institutional arrangements—would lead to desirable 
economic performance, which will usually require stability.  Or, to express the point somewhat 
differently, the purpose of a theoretical analysis will often be to determine the conditions under 
which a system will be dynamically stable and unstable.  But, obviously, the adoption of the 
stability criterion for selection among solutions would be logically incompatible with use of the 
models' solution to determine if (or under what conditions) instability would be forthcoming.  To 
the extent, then, that this objective of analysis is important, the stability criterion is inherently 
unsuitable.  One cannot use a model to determine whether property “A” would be forthcoming, if 
the model includes a requirement that “A” must not obtain. 
     In addition, there are a substantial number of cases in which there exists an infinity of solution 
paths all of which are stable.  In such cases, then, the stability criterion fails to select a single path 
on which to focus as the bubble-free or fundamentals path.
9   That failure would be defensible if it 
were true that no single path has special characteristics that justify labeling it as bubble-free, but it 
is not.  Even in these cases the MSV criterion provides a clear demarcation between one path and 
the others.   To develop that argument is the purpose of the next section. 
                                                            
9   Because of their use of the stability criterion, Blanchard and Fischer (p. 260) suggest that if 
bubble paths are explosive then “unless the focus is specifically on bubbles, assume that the 
economy chooses the [stable] path, which is the fundamental [bubble-free] solution”—and do so 
even if there is no aspect of the model that explicitly disqualifies the explosive paths.  But then in 
cases in which the bubble paths are not explosive, they are unable to recommend among various 
courses of action.  Instead, they retreat to a hope—a “working assumption”—that “the conditions 
needed to generate stable multiplicities of equilibria are not met in practice” (p. 261).  But we know 
that in various cases this hope is not justified. 
  9 IV.  The MSV Criterion 
     The MSV criterion is designed to yield a single bubble-free solution by construction.  Its 
definition begins by limiting solutions to those that are linear
10 functions—analogous to (4) in the 
example of Section II—of a minimal set of "state variables," i.e., predetermined or exogenous 
determinants of current endogenous variables.  For a set of state variables to be minimal, it must be 
"one from which it is impossible to delete... any single variable, or group of variables, while 
continuing to obtain a solution valid  for  all  admissible parameter values" (McCallum, 1983, p. 
145).  Here the language is somewhat convoluted because there is not in general a unique minimal 
set of state variables, even though there is a unique MSV solution.  Two or more different sets of 
variables may span the same space, of course, with neither being a proper subset of the other. 
     But relying upon a minimal set of state variables is not the only requirement (in addition to 
linearity) for a MSV solution.  In cases in which the minimal set includes a lagged value of an 
endogenous variable there will typically be more than one solution to the undetermined-coefficient 
identities analogous to equations (6) above.  So one part of the definition of the MSV solution is a 
rule for selection  of  the  appropriate  solution.  That rule is that the solution continues to be based 
on a minimal set of state variables for all special cases of the parameter values.   Typically, some 
admissible sets of parameter values will include zero coefficients in all structural equations for a 
lagged endogenous variable.  But in any such case, this lagged  value  will  not  be  part  of  a  
minimal  set,  so  its solution-equation coefficient analogous to  π1  will  be  zero  for  the  MSV 
solution in that special case.  Thus the MSV solution must be, to pertain for all admissible 
parameter values, the one that is the MSV solution in that special case. 
                                                            
10   In linear models, that is. 
  10      To illustrate this determination, consider the choice between  π1
+   and π1
-  in the example of 
Section II.  In the special case in which µ1  = 0 in (2), the variable ∆pt-1 does not appear in model 
(and in fact appears to be an irrelevant bygone).  Thus ∆pt-1 can in this case affect the value of ∆pt 
only if it is—arbitrarily—expected by the economy's participants to affect ∆pt. Thus it does not 
appear in the minimal set of state variables in this special case with µ1 = 0, so π1 = 0 is implied.  
But from the perspective of the general case, it is π1
+ that yields the value 0 in this special case, π1
- 
instead being equal to  (α-1)/α.   Consequently, it is the solution to equations (6) with π1 = π1
+ that 
makes (4) the MSV solution expression for ∆pt in this model. 
     It is important to recognize that this definition for the MSV solution involves a procedure that 
makes it unique by construction.  It is logically possible to dispute whether this solution warrants 
being termed the bubble-free or fundamentals solution, although the answer seems to the present 
writer to be a clear "yes."
11   But it makes no logical sense to argue that the MSV solution is not 
unique.
12 
     In that regard, Froot and Obstfeld (1991) have suggested that the MSV solution is not unique by 
demonstrating an example in which there is a non-linear function of the single state variable that 
constitutes a minimal set.   That demonstration does not provide a valid counterexample to the 
claim of the last paragraph above, however, because linearity of the solution expressions such as 
(4) is required for the MSV solution.   It is not surprising, it should be said, that Froot and Obstfeld 
                                                            
11   The reason, of course, is that all other solutions involve—at least in special case—“extraneous” 
state variables, ones not in a minimal set.  Thus the solution values involve variables that do not 
appear in the model’s structural equations and therefore affect the endogenous variables only 
because they are (arbitrarily) expected to do so.  I would also claim that the MSV solution 
corresponds to the bubble-free or fundamental values in all the standard, non-contentious examples 
in the literature.  This claim cannot be proved correct, of course, but I am happy to put it forth as a 
refutable conjecture. 
12    Recall that our argument is presuming a linear model.  It is possible to distinguish MSV 
solutions in some nonlinear models, but no general analysis has yet been developed. 
  11 would have misinterpreted the definition given in McCallum (1983), because the latter mistakenly 
took it for granted that only linear expressions would provide solutions in the class of linear models 
considered.  But the outlined procedure, which defines the MSV solution, was expressly designed 
to yield a unique solution.  So the restriction of linearity would have been explicitly included if the 
author had realized that it was needed. 
     The example presented in Section II was chosen, as one would expect, to illustrate points 
concerning the contrast between MSV and other solution criteria.  In particular, for values of µ1 < 
2α-1, the MSV solution features dynamic instability since π1
+  < -1.  Thus this case demonstrates 
that the set of solutions selected by the MSV criterion, but ruled out by the stability criterion, is not  
empty.   It is, moreover, intuitively plausible that instability would obtain in this case, as it reflects 
a very strong application of policy feedback response—which when excessive induces "instrument 
instability."  Indeed, this is an example of the type of determination that a dynamic model should  
be  able  to  provide—i.e.,  the conditions under which feedback is destabilizing.  Alternatively, the 
example of Section II also illustrates the possibility of non-exploding bubble solutions, which occur 
when 1 < µ1 < (α-1)
2/(-4α). 
     At this point in the discussion it should be clear that the MSV criterion may be regarded as a 
classification scheme, i.e., a technique for delineating the solution that is of a bubble-free or 
fundamental nature from those that include bubble components.   This scheme is intended to be 
scientifically useful, by providing a single solution that the researcher may focus upon if he/she is 
engaged in an investigation  such  that  the  possibility  of  bubbles  is deliberately excluded at  the  
outset.   In addition, the classification scheme serves a second scientific purpose by providing the 
basis for a substantive hypothesis to the effect that market outcomes in actual economies are 
generally of the bubble-free variety.  Even though RE general equilibrium analysis provides no 
  12 general theoretical basis for ruling out bubble solutions, it is a coherent plausible substantive 
hypothesis that such solutions do not occur in practice. 
     The plausibility of that hypothesis is emphasized by the undetermined-coefficient method of 
deriving the MSV solution.  The relevant point is that, in the space of π1 values, the bubble-free 
value π1
+ is of measure 1/2.   And this continues to be true in the special case with µ1 = 0 in which 
there is an infinity of non-MSV bubble paths.  In that case, the MSV solution features π1
+ = 0, 
yielding ∆pt = µ0- ut.  Use of the value π1
-  =  (α-1)/α, however, gives rise in this case to an infinity 
of solutions of the form 
(8)    ∆pt = π0 + π1∆pt-1 + π2ut + π3ut-1, 
where the multiplicity arises because any value of π3 will satisfy the model when π1 equals (α-1)/α 
(given that µ1 = 0).  For some researchers, it is a common practice in such cases to presume that the 
outcome—the particular path realized in the market—is determined by an  "initial condition” ∆p0 
that serves to pin down π2.  From that perspective there is only a single value of ∆p0 that will imply 
π2 = -1, and also that π1  = π3  = 0, thereby yielding the bubble-free solution.
13    In the space of 
initial conditions, then, the bubble-free outcome is of measure zero.  But is entirely unclear which 
of these spaces is relevant to the market's solution outcome.   It is thus a plausible hypothesis that 
bubble-free solutions will obtain generally.
14   The generation of that hypothesis is the second 
scientific contribution of the MSV solution criterion. 
                                                            
13   Recall that we are discussing the case with π1 = 0.  The solution value for π3 when π1 = (α-1)/α 
is undetermined. 
 
14   Application to the striking argument of Woodford (1994, pp. 105-111), Bernanke and Woodford 
(1997, pp. 669-675), and Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1997, pp. 20-23), is considered below in 
Section VII. 
  13 V.  The Expectational Stability Criterion 
     The last alternative criterion to be explicitly discussed is that of  "expectational stability" as 
developed by Evans  (1985, 1986).
15    The basic idea is to determine whether there is convergence 
of an iterative procedure toward a RE solution; if there is such convergence the RE solution 
approached is the one selected by this criterion.  It is not entirely clear whether the steps in the 
iterative process  are  supposed  to  reflect  sequential  positions  in calendar time or in some type of 
conceptual meta-time, but to this reader the latter seems more appropriate.  In any event, the 
sequence of calculations begins with a function, analogous to the expression just below  (4), that 
determines expectations—but with coefficients that differ somewhat from those implied by RE  in  
the  model  at  hand.   Then the model and this expectation function imply a "law of motion” for the 
model’s endogenous variables.  This law of motion, which may not be fully consistent with the 
expectation function used in its derivation, is then adopted as the basis for a revised expectation 
function to be used (in the same way) in the next round of the iterative process.  Expectational 
stability obtains when this process converges to the RE solution under consideration.
16    In fact 
there are two variants: weak expectational stability obtains if the original expectation function is 
specified so as to include the same determining “state variables” as the RE solution under 
consideration, whereas strong expectational stability obtains when additional variables are 
permitted in the expectations function. 
                                                            
15   For more recent developments see Evans (1989) and Evans and Honkapohja (1992, 1997). 
16   Actually, it is shown by Evans (1989) and Evans and Honkapohja (1997) that expectational 
stability obtains when the differential equation analog of this difference equation converges.  This 
will be the case under a somewhat broader set of conditions, so convergence of the iterative 
procedure is sufficient but not necessary of expectational stability.  This result draws on Marcet and 
Sargent (1989). 
  14      The process can be illustrated with the model of Section II.  With a RE solution of form (4), 
whether or not it is the MSV solution, expectations will conform to Et∆pt+1 = π0 + π1∆pt so the 
iterative procedure assumes that expectations at t of ∆pt+1 satisfy 
(9)    ∆pt+1
e,n = φ0
n + φ1
n  ∆pt, 
where n indexes the iterations.   Now with  (9) prevailing, ∆pt will be determined by the analog of 
(3), namely,      µ0 + µ1∆pt-1 = ∆pt + α(φ0
n + φ1
n∆pt) - α∆pt
e + ut  ,  where ∆pt
e is given from the 
past.
17   The last equation can be written as 
(10)       ∆pt = (1 + αφ1
n)
-1  [µ0 - αφ0
n  + µ1∆pt-1 + α∆pt
e - ut] 
and it suggests that expectations for ∆pt+1 should satisfy 
(11)      ∆pt-1
e,n+1 = (1-α + αφ1
n)
-1   [µ0  - αφ0
n + µ1∆pt]  
since ut is white noise.  Then writing the right-hand side of the latter in form (9) gives 
(12)        φ0
n+1   = (1-α + αφ1
n)
-1 (µ0  - αφ0
n)                      φ1
n+1  = (1-α + αφ1
n)
-1  µ1, 
which define an iterative process for the values. 
     From the second of expressions (12), we see that the stationary values for φ1  are the same as the 
two roots in  (7).   The  expectational stability analysis selects the one—if there is one—for which 
the difference  equation in φ1
n  is dynamically stable, i.e., the one that would be  approached  by  
the iterative process.  From plots of φ1
n+1 vs. φ1
n such as those in Figure 2,  we  can  see that the root 
φ1
+  is (locally) stable, since the slope is  less  than  1.0  in absolute value for all µ1 <(α-1)
2 /(-4α).  
At the 
                                                            
17   It is not entirely clear whether Evans and Honkapohja (1992, 1997) would agree with this 
derivation, as their examples do not include expectations formed at different times.  But in the 
present model, ∆pt
e is clearly meant to represent the expectation of ∆pt formed in period t-1.  So it 
is not what the iterative procedure at t is concerned with! Thus it would seem incorrect to write   
φ0
n-1 +  φ1
n-1 ∆pt-1  in place of ∆pt
e in (10).  
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  16 root φ1
-, by contrast, the slope will exceed 1.0 in absolute value so the iterative process will not be 
convergent.  With φ1  = φ1
+, moreover, the behavior of φ0
n is stable for all  parameter values  
yielding real roots in (6b).   In this example, then, the expectational stability criterion points to the 
same solution as does the MSV criterion as long as µ1<1. 
     It is not entirely clear, however, just how much emphasis should be placed on that agreement.  
One reason is that Evans and Honkapohja  (1992) argue that there are some cases in which 
expectational stability does not point to the MSV solution.  I am not entirely persuaded that these 
cases include any well-motivated economic models, but in any event that is not the main point.  
The point, instead, is that if the analysis calls for focus on the bubble-free solution, then that would 
still be accomplished by means of the MSV criterion.  If expectational stability provides an 
accurate guide to the behavior in actual economies, then a non-MSV bubble solution would prevail 
in such cases.  But that would provide no reason for changing the classification of bubble vs. non-
bubble solutions.   And it is far from certain that expectational stability does provide a guide for 
actual economic behavior, for that hypothesis requires that this particular iterative process, among 
all those that could be conjectured, is empirically relevant.  Nevertheless, while the amount of 
warranted emphasis is unclear, it is the case that in mostif not allsensible models the 






                                                            
18   The example in Evans and Honkapohja (1992) is an exception but is not, I would suggest, as 
well motivated as the model in the present paper, which differs in its assumptions regarding the 
times (actually, information sets) relevant for forming expectations of ∆pt and ∆pt+1. 
  17 VI.  General Derivation in Linear Models 
 
  The argument above has relied on the proposition that there is a unique MSV solution in a 
wide class of linear models; the main purpose of this section is to demonstrate the validity of that 
claim.  In addition, a second purpose is to present a compact and easily understood exposition of a 
convenient and practical computational procedure for solving linear rational expectations  models.  
This procedure, which is applicable to a class of models that is broad enough to include most cases 
of practical interest, can be implemented by means of a MATLAB routine provided by Paul Klein 
(1997).
19  The present exposition departs from Klein’s, however, by relying upon the elementary 
undetermined-coefficients (UC) approach used throughout the present paper.  In a sense,  the 
current exposition could be viewed as merely an extension to the appendix of McCallum (1983).  It 
is an extension that is nontrivial, however, and essential for practical (i.e., computational) purposes.  
Here it is accomplished by use of the generalized Schur decomposition theorem discussed by Klein.  
The UC reasoning utilized here is, however, much more elementary mathematically than Klein’s.
20 
 Let  yt be a M×1 vector of non-predetermined endogenous variables, kt be a K×1 vector of 
predetermined endogenous variables, and ut be a N×1 vector of exogenous variables.  The model  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
19 Klein’s (1997) approach builds upon earlier contributions of King and Watson (1995) and Sims 
(1996).  Other significant recent contributions are Uhlig (1997) and Binder and Pesaran (1995), 
which use UC analysis.  The Uhlig paper also features a useful procedure for linearizing models 
that include nonlinear relationships. 
 
20 An earlier draft of this paper included a demonstration that closed-form representations of MSV 
solutions can be obtained by means of formulae developed by Whiteman (1983).  This 
demonstration was illustrated in the context of the simple example of Section II, in line with the 
much more extensive analysis in McCallum (1985).  That analysis was more tedious and less useful 
that that of the present section, however, since the latter is based on a convenient computational 
algorithm.  The present discussion is taken in large part from McCallum (1998). 
 
  18 can then be written as 
 
(14) A11 Etyt+1 = B11yt + B12kt + C1ut 
(15) ut = Rut-1 + εt 
 
where A11 and B11 are square matrices while εt is a N×1 white noise vector.
21  Thus ut is formally a 
first-order autoregressive process, which can of course be defined so as represent AR processes of 
higher orders for the basic exogenous variables.  Also, for the predetermined variables we assume 
 
(16) kt+1 = B21yt + B22kt + C2ut. 
 
If only once-lagged values of yt were included in kt, then we would have B21 = I,  B22 = 0, and   C2 
= 0, but the present setup is much more general.  Crucially, the matrices A11, B21, and B22 may be 
singular; that is what makes the setup convenient in practice. 
  In this setting a UC solution will be of the form 
 
(17) yt = Ωkt + Γut 
 
(18) kt+1 = Π1kt + Π2ut,  
                                                          
 
 
21 Here, as above, Etyt+1 is the expectation of yt+1 conditional upon an information set that includes 
all of the model’s variables dated t and earlier. 
 
  19 where the Ω, Γ, Π1, and Π2 matrices are real.  Therefore, Etyt+1 = ΩEtkt+1 + ΓEtut+1 = Ω(Π1kt+Π2ut) 
+ ΓRut.  Substitution into (14) and (16) then yields 
 
(19) A11[Ω(Π1kt+Π2ut) + ΓRut] = B11[Ωkt+Γut] + B12kt + C1ut 
and 
(20) (Π1kt+Π2ut) = B21(Ωkt+Γut) + B22kt + C2ut. 
 
Collecting terms in kt, it is implied by UC reasoning that 
 



































whereas the terms in ut imply 
 
(22) A11Ω Π2 + A11ΓR = B11Γ + C1 
 
(23)  Π2 = B21Γ + C2. 
 
  Let A and B denote the two square matrices in (21), and assume that B-λA is nonzero for 
some complex number λ.  This last condition will not hold if the model is poorly formulated (i.e., 
fails to place any restriction on some endogenous variable); otherwise it will be satisfied even with 
singular A11, B21, B22.
22  Then the generalized Schur decomposition theorem guarantees the 
                                                            
22 See King and Watson (1995) or Klein (1997). 
  20 existence of unitary (therefore invertible) matrices Q and Z such that QAZ = S and QBZ = T, where 
S and T are triangular.
23  The ratios tii/sii are generalized eigenvalues of the matrix pencil   B - λA;
24 
they can be rearranged without contradicting the foregoing theorem.  Such rearrangements 
correspond to selection of different UC solutions as discussed in McCallum (1983, pp. 145-147 and 
165-166).  We shall return to this topic below; for the moment let us assume that the eigenvalues 
tii/sii (and associated columns of Q and Z) are arranged in order of their moduli with the largest 
values first. 
  Now premultiply (21) by Q and define H ≡ Z
-1.  Then since QA = SH and QB = TH, the 
resulting equation is 
 

























































and its first row can be written as 
 
(25) S11(H11Ω+H12)Π1 = T11(H11Ω+H12). 
 
The latter will be satisfied for Ω such that 
 
(26)  Ω =  H
-1




11 Z Z H H
− − -  = Z12
-1
22 Z , 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
23 See Golub and Van Loan (1996, p. 377). 
 
24 Or, in the terminology used by Uhlig (1997), are eigenvalues of B with respect to A. 
 
  21  





  Next, writing out the second row of (24) we get 
 
(27) S21(H11Ω+H12)Π1 + S22(H21Ω+H22) Π1 = T21(H11Ω+H12) + T22(H21Ω+H22). 
 
Then using (26) and HZ = I we can simplify this to 
 
(28) S22    Π
-1




so since S  exists by construction 
-1
22
26 we have 
 
(29)  Π1 = Z22 S  T
-1




 To  find  Γ and Π2 we return to (22) and (23).  Combining them we have 
 
(30) GΓ + A11ΓR = F 
                                                            
25 This is the same condition as that required by Klein (1997, p. 13) and King and Watson (1995, 
pp. 9-11).  It appears to provide no difficulties in practice.  The King and Watson example of a 
system in which the condition does not hold  is one in which B12 = 0 in my notation so the MSV 
solution has Ω = 0 and the other solution matrices follow easily. 
 
26 By the arrangement of generalized eigenvalues, S22 has no zero elements on the diagonal (and is 
triangular). 
 
  22  
where G ≡ A11ΩB21 - B11 and F ≡ C1 - A11ΩC2.  If G
-1 exists, which it typically will with 
nonsingular B11, the latter becomes 
 




This can be solved for Γ by the steps given in McCallum (1983, p. 163) or can be obtained as 
 





as in Klein (1997, p. 28).
27  Finally, Π2 is obtained from (23).  In sum, the UC solution for a given 
ordering of the eigenvalues is given sequentially by equations (26), (24), (32), and (23). 
 
  Different values of Ω, and thus different solutions, will be obtained for different orderings 
of the generalized eigenvalues tii/sii.  What ordering should be used to obtain the economically 
relevant solution?  Many writers, following Blanchard and Kahn (1980), arrange them in order of 
decreasing modulus and conclude that a unique solution obtains if and only if the number with 
modulus less than 1.0 (“stable roots”) equals K, the number of predetermined variables.  The 
minimal-state-variable (MSV) procedure, by contrast, is to choose the arrangement that would yield 
Ω = 0 if it were the case that B12 = 0—this step relying upon the continuity of eigenvalues with 
                                                            
27 This uses the identity that if A, B, C are real conformable matrices, vec(ABC) = (C
′⊗A) vec(B).  
See Golub and Van Loan (1996, p. 180). 
 
  23 respect to parameters.
28  Uhlig (1997, p. 17) correctly notes that this procedure is difficult to 
implement and also that in many cases it will lead to the same solution as the Blanchard-Kahn 
stability criterion.  Adoption of the decreasing-value arrangement will therefore often be attractive, 
even for MSV adherents.  In such cases it seems unnecessary, however, to limit one’s attention to 
problems in which there are exactly K stable roots.  If there are fewer than K stable roots, the MSV 
criterion will produce a single explosive solution whereas if there are more than K stable roots, it 
will yield the single stable solution that is bubble-free—both of these being solutions that may be of 
particular scientific interest.  In those exceptional cases in which an MSV analyst suspects that the 
Blanchard-Kahn and MSV criteria would call for different solutions, he/she could replace B12 with 
α B12, plot eigenvalues for various values of α between 1 and 0, and then adjust the ordering if 
necessary.   
VII. Relevance for Recent Issues 
  The example of Section II is simple and clearly related to much of the existing bubble 
literature, but may seem remote from most monetary policy discussions of the late 1990s.  To show 
that such is not the case—that the example is in fact highly relevant—is the purpose of the present 
section. 
  Let us begin by considering the following model, in which yt denotes the log of output 
relative to capacity, Rt is a nominal interest rate, and vt is a white-noise disturbance: 
(33) yt = b0 + b1 (Rt - Et∆pt+1) + vt    b 1<0 
(34)  ∆pt = (1-θ) Et∆pt+1 + θ∆pt-1 + αyt   α>0 
(35) Rt = µ0 + µ1 (Et∆pt+1 - ∆p
*) + µ2yt   µ1,µ2>0 
                                                            
28 With B12 = 0, kt does not appear in the system (14) (19), in this case so kt represents extraneous 
variables of a bootstrap, bubble, or sunspot nature. 
  24 Here (33) is a textbook-style IS function,
29 (34) is a price-adjustment relation that with 0≤θ<1 can 
represent either the specification of Calvo (1983) and Rotemberg (1982) or the Fuhrer-Moore 
(1995) setup, and (35) is an interest-rate policy rule that can reflect pure inflation targeting (with µ2 
= 0) or a rule of the more general Taylor (1993) variety. 
  Substitution of (35) into (33) and elimination of yt then yields a linear equation that includes 
the variables ∆pt, Et∆pt+1, ∆pt-1, and vt.  That list differs from the one pertaining to equation (5) by 
not including Et-1∆pt+1, but that difference is of no consequence for the issues at hand because the 
distinction between Et∆pt+1 and Et-1∆pt+1 is irrelevant for the condition analogous to (6b) that 
determines the value of the crucial coefficient on ∆pt-1 in the RE solution expression.  Indeed, it can 
be verified that for some admissible parameter values the system has two stable solutions.
30 
Interestingly, large values of µ1 do not generate explosive MSV solutions with the policy rule (35), 
but if ∆pt-1 is entered in place of Et∆pt+1 then large µ1 values will induce instability, just as in the 
example of Section II. 
  An issue that has attracted considerable attention recently is the so-called “Woodford 
warning” of possible solution “indeterminacy” when policy feedback rules relate to market 
expectations of inflation or some other target variable, a problem emphasized by Woodford (1994), 
Kerr and King (1996), Bernanke and Woodford (1997), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1997), and 
Svensson (1998).  An example can be presented in the following system, which is adapted from 
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1997, p. 16):  
(36) yt = Etyt+1 + b1 (Rt - Et∆pt+1) + vt   b 1<0 
                                                            
29   It would be more desirable theoretically to use an expectational IS relation, as argued in 
McCallum and Nelson (1997) and elsewhere, but that would lead to a cubic equation for the 
coefficient on ∆pt-1 in the MSV solution without altering the basic message. 
30   Two stable solutions exist if the parameters are α = 0.2, b1 = 0.5, θ = 0.2, and µ1 = 0.5. 
  25 (37)  ∆pt = βEt∆pt+1 + αEtyt     α>0, 0<β<1 
(38) Rt = µ1Et∆pt+1      µ1>0 
Here we have an expectational IS function, a Calvo-Rotemberg price adjustment specification, and 
a pure inflation-forecast targeting rule.
31  For simplicity, constants are eliminated by normalization 
and vt is again taken to be white noise.  In this system there are no predetermined variables so the 
MSV solution is of the form yt = φ1vt, ∆pt = φ2vt.  Trivial calculations show that φ1 = 1, φ2 = α so 
the solution is yt = vt, ∆pt = αvt.  The policy coefficient µ1 does not appear in the solution equations 
because policy is responding to the expected future inflation rate, which is a constant (normalized 
to zero).  A caveat must be applied to the foregoing, however: the MSV solution is defined only for 
µ1>1.0.  Values of µ1<1.0 are inadmissible for “process consistency” reasons, introduced by Flood 
and Garber (1980a) and discussed in McCallum (1983, pp. 159-160). 
  But suppose that the researcher looks for solutions of the form 
(39) yt = φ11∆pt-1 + φ12vt 
(40)  ∆pt = φ21∆pt-1 + φ22vt. 
Then Etyt+1 = φ11(φ21∆pt-1 φ22vt), Et∆pt+1 = φ21(φ21∆pt-1 +φ22vt), and the undetermined-coefficient 
conditions analogous to (6) are 
(41a)  φ11 = φ11φ21 + b1(µ1–1)φ21
2 
(41b)  φ12 = φ11φ22 + b1(µ1-1)φ21 φ22 + 1 
(41c)  φ21 = βφ21
2 + αφ11 
(41d)  φ22 = βφ21φ22 +αφ12. 
From the first and third of these we obtain the crucial requirement 
                                                            
31   Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1997) also include terms involving yt and Rt-1 on the right-hand side 
of (38).  They are omitted here only to keep the example as simple and transparent as possible. 
  26 (42)  φ21 = βφ21
2 + αb1(µ1-1)φ21
2/(1-φ21). 
Clearly, one root of the foregoing is φ21 = 0, which implies φ11 = 0 and consequently gives the MSV 
solution.  But (42) is also satisfied by values of φ21 such that 
(43)  φ21 = 
β
β − δ ± δ
2
] 4 [
2 / 1 2
,     δ = 1 + β + αb1(µ1 – 1). 
Here δ
2 - 4β is positive for µ1 < 1 and µ1 > 1 + [2β
1/2 –(1+β)]/(-b1α).
32  So for those values, there 
are non-zero real roots for φ21 and thus solutions in addition to the MSV solution.  That this 
possibility obtains for large values of µ1 represents a problem for monetary policy, according to the 
non-MSV analysis of the authors mentioned above.  But under the hypothesis that the MSV 
solution prevails, large values of µ1 pose no problem: the solution remains yt = vt, ∆pt =  α vt.  Since 
µ1 → ∞ is conceptually akin to setting Rt such that Et∆pt+1 = 0, where 0 is the implicit target rate of 
inflation, the MSV hypothesis seems more consistent with the inflation forecast targeting 
prescription of Svensson (1998) than does the non-MSV analysis of Bernanke and Woodford 
(1997) or Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1997).  This conclusion pertains, I conjecture, to this entire 
body of analysis, not just the single (and extreme) case considered above.  In any event, it should 
be emphasized that if a  multiplicity of solutions is found by considering non-MSV procedures, it 
has nothing to do with the phenomenon of “nominal indeterminacy”—i.e., cases in which a model 
determines values of real variables but not nominal variables.  For a recent discussion of this 
distinction, see McCallum (1997). 
  Finally, we might also mention the “fiscal theory of price level determination,” due 
principally to Woodford (1995) and Sims (1994), which has been attracting a good bit of attention.  
                                                            
32   Note that with the values β = .99, α = .3, b1 = -1 used by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1997), this 
last expression equals 1 + [1.96 + 1.99]/0.3 = 14.2, precisely as reported in their Table 4 for this 
special case. 
  27 In this regard, the argument presented in Section 7 of McCallum (1997) indicates that adoption of 
the fiscal theory of price level determination, in contrast to the more traditional “monetarist” 
approach, amounts to acceptance of the hypothesis that a non-MSV or bubble solution is 
empirically relevant.  The MSV solution is also available,
33 however, and implies fully traditional 
price level-money stock relationships and behavior. 
VIII. Conclusions 
     Let us conclude with a brief summary. This paper has been concerned with the minimal-state-
variable (MSV) criterion for selection among solutions  in linear rational expectations models that 
feature a multiplicity of paths that satisfy all conditions for equilibrium.  The paper compares the 
MSV criterion with  others   that   have   been   proposed,   including   Taylor's   (1977) minimum-
variance criterion, the expectational stability  criterion  of  Evans (1985,  1986),  and  the  saddle-
path  or  non-explosiveness  (i.e.,  dynamic stability) criterion favored by Blanchard and Kahn 
(1980), Blanchard and Fischer (1989), Sargent  (1987), and  Whiteman  (1983)  and  utilized  in  
practice  by  a  large  number   of researchers.  It is emphasized that the MSV criterion  can  be  
viewed  as  a classification scheme, one that delineates the unique solution that is  of  a bubble-free 
nature—i.e., reflecting  only  market  fundamentals—from  those  that include bubble or bootstrap 
components. 
     It is argued that the MSV classification scheme is of  scientific  value in two ways.  First, it 
provides a unique solution upon  which  a  researcher may focus attention if the project at hand 
suggests or permits the  a  priori exclusion  of  bubble  solutions.   Second,  it  provides  the  basis  
for  a substantive hypothesis to the effect that market outcomes in actual economies are generally of 
a bubble-free nature.  In describing the  latter  role,  the paper argues that the possibility that 
                                                            
33   The example cited is one in which the model is not linear, so the MSV concept has to be 
extended and the generality of Section VI cannot be claimed. 
  28 bubble-free solutions dominate empirically is much  more  plausible  than  is  suggested  by  
solution  approaches  that parameterize different solutions by (possibly irrelevant) initial  
conditions rather than by undetermined-coefficient parameter values.  It  also  explains the basis of 
McCallum's (1983) "subsidiary principle" that is  used  to  make the MSV solution unique by  
construction.  
In the process of demonstrating the uniqueness of the MSV solution, the paper presents a 
convenient and practical computational procedure for solving linear rational expectations models of 
a very broad class.  This exposition, which utilizes the generalized Schur decomposition theorem, is 
developed by means of the mathematically simple undetermined-coefficients approach. In addition, 
examples are provided that illustrate the applicability and importance of the MSV criterion to issues 
of current concern in the analysis of monetary policy rules. 
Finally, it should be recognized that some readers may be unwilling to accept the paper’s 
interpretation of the MSV solution as the bubble-free or fundamentals solution.  In that case, it 
remains true that the MSV approach provides a unique solution upon which a researcher may focus 
attention, if desired, and provides the basis for a substantive hypothesis to the effect that actual 
outcomes generally conform to the MSV solution.  If this hypothesis is in fact true, then several 
classes of problems discussed in the literature are empirically irrelevant. 
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